Abstract: This paper examines the market reaction to changes in analysts' equity risk ratings and the type of information conveyed by such changes. We find that stock prices increase (decrease) when analysts change their risk ratings toward lower (higher) risk controlling for changes in stock recommendations, price targets, earnings forecasts and contemporaneous news about corporate events. We also find that changes in risk ratings toward lower (higher) risk are followed by decreases (increases) in Fama-French factor loadings. The combined evidence suggests that the market reacts to new information about equity risk.
Introduction
One potentially important piece of information in equity analysts' research reports is the assessment of equity risk, which can be quantitative or qualitative. Although initially voluntary, these risk assessments are now required by NYSE's Rule 472 and NASD's Rule 2210, which state that analysts' reports must disclose "the valuation methods used, and any price objectives must have a reasonable basis and include a discussion of risks" (Exchange Act Release # 48252 (July 29, 2003) ).
1 Despite the central role of analysts as information intermediaries, and of risk in asset pricing and investment decisions, these risk assessments have received little attention in the academic literature.
An exception is Lui et al. (2007) who show that analysts' quantitative risk assessments (risk ratings) incorporate publicly available information about various measures of equity risk and help predict future total volatility.
If aggregating public information into a summary statistic and forecasting future volatility are activities valued by investors, Lui et al.'s (2007) evidence suggests that the dissemination of risk ratings is an important analyst activity. To better assess their overall significance, however, it is necessary to investigate the relation between risk ratings and stock prices. Evidence that prices react to the dissemination of risk ratings would suggest that they expand the information set upon which prices are set, and thus, strongly validate the dissemination of risk ratings as a major information event in equity markets.
The primary objective of our study is to address this question by investigating the market reaction to changes in risk ratings. Our sample consists of 13,472 risk ratings (Low, Medium, High, and Speculative) on 1,157 firms issued over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup Investment Research. Risk ratings changes are not frequent: of the 13,472 observations, 378 are changes toward higher risk and 321 toward lower risk. We find that these unusual events are accompanied by unusual returns, volatility, and trading volume. For example, in our sample of risk rating increases (decreases), we document a 3-day cumulative average market-adjusted return of -3.3%
(1.36%), a reaction comparable to the market reaction to changes in analyst recommendations and price targets (Womack, 1996; Brav and Lehavy, 2003) .
To ensure that the documented market reaction is distinct from the market reaction to contemporaneous information provided within or outside the analyst report, we control for contemporaneous (i) revisions in stock recommendations, price targets, and earnings forecasts, (ii) earnings announcements, and (iii) news about corporate events likely to change firm risk. We still document a significant 3-day market response of 2.57% to announcements of risk rating changes.
In principle, any market reaction is consistent with two explanations: the market changes its assessment of risk or the market changes its assessment of future cash flows.
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To distinguish between these two explanations, we examine actual changes in risk, as measured by Fama-French factor loadings, and actual earnings growth for our samples of stocks experiencing risk rating increases and risk rating decreases.
We find that the changes in factor loadings are generally consistent with the hypothesis that the nature of the information conveyed is about equity risk. For example, the market loading increases by 11% when analysts assess a higher risk, and decreases by 8% when analysts assess a lower risk. The increase in the size factor loading when analysts assess a higher risk is even larger, ranging from 54% to 100%. Finally, the bookto-market factor loading decreases by 34% when analysts assess lower risk.
We also find that the sample of firms with increases in risk ratings experience greater earnings growth than the sample of firms with decreases in risk ratings. This result is inconsistent with the changes in cash flow explanation: if the market believes that risk rating increases reflect bad news about future earnings and that decreases reflect good news about future earnings, then the actual earnings growth should be smaller for firms experiencing increases in risk ratings (assuming the market expectations are right).
As pointed out above, we find the opposite.
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the market reacts to information about changes in equity risk, as measured by the Fama-French factors, rather than to information about changes in expected cash flows.
Our study makes two contributions. First, it broadens our understanding of how analyst provided information influences price formation by examining the market reaction to changes in analyst risk ratings -an information output that has been largely overlooked in the prior literature. Analysts' risk assessments are now required by NYSE's Rule 472 and NASD's Rule 2210; hence, understanding their pricing implications is of crucial importance. Second, and more generally, our study is the first to present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that equity analysts provide new information about equity risk as opposed to future cash flows. This is a novel hypothesis as prior literature has solely explored the role of analysts as providers of new information about future cash flows. It is also an important hypothesis since assessing systematic risk is as critical to the formation of equity prices and to portfolio allocation decisions as assessing future cash flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss prior evidence and its implications for our study. Section 3 describes the sample and section 4 presents the empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Prior evidence and its implications
Evidence on the role of analysts as providers of information about risk is scarce.
To our knowledge only Lui et al. (2007) influences price formation are best made on the basis of an event study (Fama et al., 1969) , that is, after identifying days on which risk ratings change, analyzing market behavior in event time, and controlling for concurrent events. The investment rating may consist of a recommendation and a risk rating or a recommendation only. The price is defined as the closing price on the day on which the rating is assigned or changed. If a report covers more than 6 companies, then the report does not need to make these disclosures provided that it directs the reader as to how to obtain them. 
Descriptive statistics
Panels A and B of Table 2 's legend for detailed information about rating policies). between risk ratings, stock recommendations and expected returns are not large, which enhances our ability to document risk ratings' incremental information content.
Finally, Table 3 reports transition matrixes and the number of days between research reports with new and old risk ratings and stock recommendations. As mentioned above, there are three distinct rating regimes over our sample period. We view the policy Risk ratings appear to be highly persistent at every category (Panel A of Table 3 ).
For example, the probability that a Speculative rating will be re-iterated is as high as 97% Panel B of Table 3 contains the transition matrix of stock recommendations.
Consistent with prior literature, the recommendations in our sample are also highly persistent (Barber et al., 2001) . 
Market reaction analyses
This section explores the existence of a market reaction to changes in analysts' risk ratings and its uniqueness. We first examine the overall market impact and then examine the existence of abnormal returns after controlling for contemporaneous information.
Event time analysis
To provide a complete picture of how the market responds to changes in risk ratings, we measure market impact using three different metrics: daily market-adjusted returns, standardized absolute returns, and standardized trading volume. 12 We standardize absolute returns and trading volume (total number of shares traded divided by total number of shares outstanding) to remove the effects of time-and cross-sectional variation in volatility and trading volume. 13 We examine the market impact for two samples: (i)
Risk increase sample (when risk ratings change toward riskier categories), and (ii) Risk decrease sample (when risk ratings change toward less risky categories). Table 4 reports the mean values of the three metrics, and the results from testing the null hypothesis that the mean values are zero for each day in the event period [-10, +10] , where day 0 is the event day. We control for heteroscedasticity and crosscorrelations in daily returns due to event clustering. We find that the market reacts positively to decreases in risk ratings and negatively to increases. The market-adjusted return is about 0.5% per day for three days [-1 to +1] when analysts lower their risk ratings. Investors react more strongly, however, to risk rating increases. On the event day alone prices drop by over 2%. Furthermore, the market reaction to increases in risk starts as early as day -4: the market-adjusted return on that day is -0.65%.
12 Volume and volatility-based measures of market impact have been widely used in research on earnings announcements (Beaver, 1968; Landsman and Maydew, 2002) and analyst-provided information (Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Irvine, 2007) . 13 We standardize the absolute abnormal returns and trading volume by first subtracting the corresponding means and then dividing by the corresponding standard deviations calculated over 120 trading days (minimum 60 days) prior to the event. If a minimum of 60 trading days of pre-event data is not available, we use post-event data. We exclude trading days falling in the 21-day window around a firm's earnings announcements and the issuance of its research reports when computing the means and standard deviations of the corresponding firm.
The pattern in absolute returns and trading volume around the risk rating change event is also interesting. For both the Risk increase and Risk decrease samples, absolute returns and trading volume peak on the event day. The increases in absolute returns and volume are substantial; for example, on the event day, volume is 3.5 standard deviations larger for the Risk increase sample and one standard deviation larger for the Risk decrease sample. 14 The corresponding effects for absolute returns are a bit smaller but still considerable (two standard deviations larger for the Risk increase sample and half a standard deviation for the Risk decrease sample). Finally, we find that absolute returns and trading volume both respond earlier and remain unusually high following the event.
For example, in the Risk increase sample, volume is unusually high in all days in the event window.
Overall, the combined evidence from the analysis of market-adjusted returns, absolute returns, and trading volume suggests that risk ratings have a significant market impact.
Controlling for changes in price targets and stock recommendations
In this section, we examine whether the abnormal return evidence discussed above is robust to controlling for contemporaneous information provided within the analyst report. In particular, we control for changes in stock recommendations and price targets provided by Citigroup's analysts. We use 3-day cumulative market-adjusted returns as a measure of new information because in both samples we document unusual returns over days from -1 and +1.
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Panel A of Panel B of Table 5 reports the results from the regression analysis where we control for contemporaneous information provided within the analyst report. The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, +1) cumulative market-adjusted return centered on dates on which risk ratings are announced. The independent variable of interest is the change in risk rating or Chrr, defined as the difference between current and previous risk 15 We focus on signed returns as our measure of new information because we have a specific prediction about how changes in risk ratings affect mean abnormal returns.
ratings. Positive (negative) values of Chrr represent an increase (a decrease) in risk. We also include: (i) Chrec, the change in recommendation, defined as current minus previous recommendation, and (ii) Chexpret, defined as the current expected return (current target price less current market price scaled by current market price) minus the previous expected return, defined analogously. Positive (negative) values of Chrec represent changes toward less (more) favorable recommendations. We report standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent and adjusted to account for cross-correlation in daily returns due to event clustering (the number of unique days is substantially lower than the number of events as shown in Panel A of Table 5 ).
In the first specification we regress the 3-day cumulative market-adjusted returns only on the change in risk ratings variable, Chrr. The coefficient is statistically and economically different from zero. An increase in risk by 1 (e.g., from Low to Medium risk) results in a stock price reaction of -2.5%. In specifications (2) and (3) we incorporate the control variables Chrec and Chexpret. The coefficient on Chrr in these specifications is lower than in model (1), -2.06% and -1.98%, but still statistically and economically significant. Overall, the information content of the risk ratings changes is not subsumed by changes in recommendations and expected returns.
Specifications (4) and (5) we examine whether our results are robust to (i) including consensus earnings forecast revisions as a measure of concurrent news about the levels of future cash flows, (ii) excluding days on which earnings are announced, and (iii) excluding days with riskrelated news.
i) Controlling for concurrent news about the levels of future cash flows
First, we consider the possibility that the observed market reaction is a reaction to concurrent news about the levels of future cash flows and that, somehow, the risk ratings change is correlated with it. Our proxy for news about future cash flows is based on analyst earnings forecasts, Chforecast. It is constructed as follows. We take the average of all (IBES) earnings per share forecasts disseminated in the 3-day window (current consensus). We then take the average of all IBES forecasts issued in a period of three months prior to the event (previous consensus). Finally, we subtract the previous consensus from the current consensus and scale the difference by the share price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
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The first column of Panel C of Table 5 reports the results from the analysis when we include Chforecast. The number of observations in this regression drops from 7,698
(column 5 of Panel B of Table 5 ) to 5,470 (116 risk increases and 101 risk decreases) due to the unavailability of earnings forecasts over the 3-day event window. The coefficient on Chforecast is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, which suggests that information about news about future cash flows is indeed conveyed to the market on event days. More importantly, all coefficients from the previous specifications retain their statistical and economic significance. If anything, the coefficient on risk rating increases slightly from -2.36% to -2.49%.
ii) Excluding earnings announcement days
Another possibility is that analysts tend to revise their risk ratings around earnings announcement days. If analysts revise their risk ratings toward higher (lower) risk on days on which earnings convey bad (good) news, then we will draw erroneous conclusions about the existence of a market reaction to changes in analyst risk ratings. To preclude this scenario, we exclude observations with earnings announcements occurring in the 3-day event window. 16 The results do not change when previous consensus is defined to include only forecasts issued by analysts whose forecasts comprise the current consensus.
The results after imposing this additional requirement are reported in the second column of Panel C of Table 5 . Excluding earnings announcements from the sample does not diminish the incremental information of the risk ratings (the magnitude of the coefficient is -2.53%) but does diminish the information content of our empirical proxy of changes in expected cash flows. The coefficient on Chforecast drops from 8.91% to 5.48%, (significant now at 5% level), which suggests that the information content of
Chforecast overlaps with that of the earnings announcements.
iii) Excluding days with risk-related news
A final possibility is that analysts change their risk ratings on days in which important corporate events influence company risk and/or the levels of future cash flows, and the market is reacting to these events rather than to the changes in risk ratings. To address this possibility, we searched the major newswires (Dow Jones, Reuters and Press Release) for news that could affect risk and/or cash flows. In particular, we searched for news about changes in dividend policies, changes in investment policies (merger and acquisition activities, divestures, asset sales, new project undertakings, joint ventures), changes in financing policies (debt and equity offerings and retirements/repurchases), changes in credit ratings and lawsuits. We conducted this search only for the sample of firms with risk ratings changes because this is where we observe a market reaction and to minimize our data collection cost.
The last column of Panel C of In sum, we find that the market reacts to changes in analysts' risk ratings controlling for (i) news about future cash flows, as measured by the revisions in the consensus earnings forecasts, (ii) news disseminated during earnings announcements, and (iii) news about corporate events that could potentially affect company risk or cash flows.
Exploring the nature of the market reaction
While the role of analysts as providers of new information about cash flows is well documented and accepted in the academic literature, their role as providers of new information about systematic risk is yet to be established. Our evidence that the market reacts to changes in risk ratings and Lui et al. 's (2007) evidence that the risk ratings incorporate public information of firm characteristics associated with risk are suggestive of such a role, but far from conclusive. The reason is that the observed market reaction is also consistent with the hypothesis that the risk rating changes, or other elements of the research report uncontrolled for in our regressions, convey new information about future 17 We also conducted our analysis after excluding 50 observations with confounding events over a [-4,+4] window and our results remain the same. For the sake of brevity, these analyses are untabulated.
cash flows. 18 Since the alternative explanation is grounded in the traditional view of analysts as providers of cash flow information, it requires serious consideration.
To further distinguish between the two interpretations of the market reaction - (1) it is due to the dissemination of new information about future cash flows and (2) it is due to the dissemination of information about equity risk -we explore whether the Fama- 
Changes in factor loadings

Preliminaries
We explore an empirical implication of the view that changes in risk ratings convey new information about equity risk, which is that equity risk indeed changes around the event. The basic idea that risk changes around some corporate or financial reporting event has been tested in various settings (Ibbotson, 1975; Brennan and Copeland, 1988; Ball and Kothari, 1991, among others 
(1) using pre-event observations and using post-event observations where R i,t is the return on a sample firm i on day t, RF i,t and MKT i,t are the risk free rate and the market return on day t. The risk-free rate and the market return are indexed by i and t because they pair up with day t's return on security i. The two estimations yield pre-event and post-event beta, which are then compared to assess the extent of variation in risk around the event.
We generally follow Brennan and Copeland's (1998) approach. One difference is that we also consider the size (SMB) and market-to-book (HML) factors as measures of risk in view of their empirical success as determinants of average returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1993) . Another difference is that we estimate one regression with indicator variables that identify post-event observations to facilitate the statistical testing of changes in risk. 
where R i,t is the return on sample firm i on day t; Factor i,t is the vector of factor returns on day t; RF i,t is the risk-free rate based on the one month Treasury rate on day t; and I i,t, after is an indicator variable equal to one when day t is after the event day or equal to 0 otherwise.
We estimate equation (2) using observations from the intervals [-90, +90] , [-150, 150] , and [-210, 210] . The coefficient of interest is β_after. It captures the changes in factor loadings from the pre-event period. We also require that a firm has observations on every day of the window analyzed so that any changes in factor loadings are not due to firms entering/leaving the sample. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and robust to cross-correlation in contemporaneous returns (Rogers, 1993) . 
Main results
Our results are reported in Table 6 and are consistent across the three different windows, [-90, +90] , [-150, 150] , and [-210, 210] . Hence, for brevity, we only discuss the numbers for the shorter window.
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Overall, we find that the changes in factor loadings are generally consistent with the hypothesis that the market reacts to information about equity risk. In the Risk Increase sample, we find strong evidence that the market and size factor loadings increase; the MKT loading of 1.19 increases by 11% (=0.13/1.19) and the SMB loading of 0.18 increases by 100% (=0.18/0.18). In the Risk decrease sample, we document a decline in the loading on the MKT factor of 8% (=-0.08/0.99), but no corresponding decline in the loading on the SMB factor. Finally, the loading on the HML factor decreases by 34% (=-0.12/0.35) in the Risk decrease sample but does not change in the Risk increase sample. The results for the longer windows are similar although we find stronger effects for the HML factor in the Risk decrease sample.
19 Another approach to documenting changes in risk would be to examine changes in firm characteristics around the event. We did not adopt it for a number of reasons. First, only the estimation of factor loadings allows us to study changes in risk in very close proximity to the event of interest. Second, an analysis of factor loadings around an event naturally complements an analysis of mean returns in event time. The two sets of analyses focus on different aspects of return distributions around an event. 20 Focusing on a shorter window also allows us to better isolate changes in factor loadings around the event date. This is important given the extensive evidence on time variation in betas (e.g., Shanken, 1991; Harvey and Ferson, 1991; Ghysels, 1998) .
We also observe an interesting pattern for the intercepts. The intercepts are negative (positive) for the Risk increase (Risk decrease) sample before the changes in risk ratings occur but the pattern reverses afterwards. Their magnitude is quite substantial, especially for the Risk increase sample: -0.14% daily abnormal return before the change in risk ratings and 0.15% afterwards. It seems that analysts revise their risk ratings upward (downward) after negative (positive) abnormal returns occur.
Sensitivity analyses
In this sub-section we explore the sensitivity of our evidence about changes in factor loadings to (1) the use of other factor loading estimation approaches, and (2) controlling for the well-known ability of past returns to predict changes in equity risk (Chan, 1988; and Ball and Kothari, 1989) . The results discussed below are for the [-90, +90] window and are untabulated for brevity.
We estimate factor loadings in two ways: at the portfolio level and at the firm level. In our portfolio analyses, we first form pre-event and post-event return portfolios, and then test for differences in portfolio betas. 21 In our firm level analyses, we first estimate pre-event and post-event beta for each firm experiencing the event, and then test whether the distribution of pre-event betas differs from that of post-event betas.
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Overall, the tenor of our results remains. For example, in the Risk decrease sample the market loading decreases by 0.14 (portfolio approach) and 0.09 (firm specific 21 As is common in the literature, we equally weight calendar days. Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Kothari and Warner (2007) point out that equal weighting calendar days may reduce statistical power. 22 While this approach ignores the existence of cross-correlation, it is important to note that cross-sectional dependence in daily returns is fairly mild. Bernard (1987) reports that the cross-sectional correlation in market-adjusted returns at the daily level is only 0.04 and that it increases monotonically in the return interval to 0.33 at the annual level. approach), both changes are statistically significant at 1% level. In the Risk increase sample the market loading increases by 0.06 (portfolio approach) and 0.06 (firm-specific approach). We also document a statistically significant increase in the SMB factor loadings in the Risk increase sample (firm-specific approach), but no evidence that the HML factor loading decreases in the Risk decrease sample.
Our second set of sensitivity analyses controls for the ability of past returns to predict changes in equity risk. As documented by Chen (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) , market risk increases after stocks experience negative returns and decreases after positive returns. Since, on average, the stocks in the Risk increase sample experience negative returns in the pre-event window (see previous section), it is possible that our evidence of increases in factor loadings for this sample is driven by this universal phenomenon. Likewise, the decreases in factor loadings for the Risk decrease sample could be driven by positive returns in the pre-event period. To preclude this possibility, we estimate the regression after eliminating stocks with negative (positive) returns in the pre-event window from the Risk increase (decrease) sample. If our results are driven by prior stock performance, this elimination should reverse our results.
This prediction is not borne out in the data. In particular, the market and the SMB factor loadings still increase for the Risk increase sample of 122 firms with positive returns, with the SMB loading change statistically significant at 5%. All three factor loadings decrease in the Risk decrease sample of firms with negative returns, with the market and HML loadings statistically significant at 10% level.
Finally, we examine whether the documented change in risk is exclusively driven by days adjacent to the event. We exclude observations in the [-10,+10] window with no effect on our results.
In sum, we find robust evidence that the Fama-French factor loadings, and the market loading, in particular, change around days on which risk ratings are revised. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the documented market reaction to changes in risk ratings (in Table 5 ) is due to new information about risk.
Changes in realized earnings growth around Risk increases and Risk decreases
The pattern of changes in market loadings documented in section 5.1 does not by itself preclude the hypothesis that concurrent arrival of cash flow information drives the observed market reaction. To shed light on this hypothesis, we examine changes in realized earnings growth around Risk increases and Risk decreases (see Healy and Palepu (1990) for a similar approach). If the positive market reaction in the Risk decrease sample is due to the dissemination of information that earnings growth will accelerate, then the change in earnings growth will be positive. Similarly, if the negative market reaction in the Risk increase sample is due to the dissemination of information that earnings growth will decelerate, then the change in earnings growth will be negative.
We define earnings growth as seasonally differenced quarterly earnings per share.
We scale earnings growth by market price one month prior to the event so that we can pool earnings growth observations on different companies. We drop observations where price is less than $5 to address the small denominator problem, and exclude companies that do not have quarterly earnings observations in each quarter to ensure that changes in the sample composition over time do not affect our results.
Our results are presented in Table 7 . We report the mean earnings growth for quarters -4 to +4 (0 is the event quarter) for the two samples and t-statistics from our statistical tests. We test the hypothesis that earnings growth over quarters -4 to -1 is the same as the earnings growth over quarters +1 to +4 in the two samples. We also test whether the change in earnings growth in the Risk decrease sample is equal to that in the Risk increase sample.
In both samples we document a statistically significant increase in earnings growth. The increase in earnings growth in the Risk increase sample is 0.0042
(difference between the mean growth over quarters -4 to -1, -0.0024, and the mean growth over quarters +1 to +4, 0.0018), considerably greater than the increase in the Risk decrease sample, 0.0008. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Interestingly, the earnings growth in quarters -4 to 0 in the Risk increase sample is not only always lower than the corresponding earnings growth in the Risk decrease sample, but also consistently negative. Only in the last two quarters does the earnings growth of the Risk increase sample surpass the earnings growth in the Risk decrease sample.
Overall, we find no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the observed market reaction is due to the dissemination of new information about the levels of future cash flows. We conclude that the market reaction to changes in analysts' risk ratings is due to changes in the market assessment of systematic risk.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the significance and the nature of the information conveyed by financial analysts' risk assessments. Using a large sample of risk ratings provided by a prominent research provider, we document an economically significant stock price reaction of 2.5% when analysts revise their risk assessments. Our interpretation is that the risk rating changes provide new information to the market about changes in equity risk rather than changes in cash flows. This interpretation is corroborated by evidence that equity risk, as measured by the Fama-French factor loadings, increases (decreases) when analysts revise their ratings toward higher (lower) risk, and evidence showing that the price impact of changes in risk ratings remains after controlling for analysts' forecast revisions, earnings announcements and concurrent news about corporate events.
Important questions remain unexplored. First, since risk ratings, stock recommendations, and price targets are jointly determined, addressing a broader question of how the market uses these information outputs requires researchers to develop a model of how they are formed and related to each other. Second, Lui et al. (2007) report that not all research providers supply risk assessments in the form of ratings, which raises the question about differences in the value added by research providers. Analysts may add value by providing different estimates for items they all forecast (e.g., earnings forecasts and stock recommendations) but also by providing different types of information (e.g., risk ratings). Pursuing this line of research would require a shift in focus away from analyzing information outputs supplied by all or most brokerages toward studying research reports (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005) . This may not prove easy though as many prominent brokerages have discontinued the practice of making their research reports available on Investext and tried to limit the dissemination of research reports to paying customers. 09/05/2002 09/05/ , 09/06/2002 09/05/ -09/11/2003 09/05/ , and After 09/11/2003 respectively. For each period we report categories used, the total number and the percentage of risk ratings (Panel A) and recommendations (Panel B) falling in a particular category.
Before 09/06/2002, recommendations had five categories: Buy (1), Outperform (2), Neutral (3), Underperform (4) and Sell (5) where Buy indicates an expected total return ranging from 15% or more for Low-Risk stock to 30% or more for Speculative stock; Outperform indicates expected return ranging from 5% to 15% (Low risk) to 10% to 30% (Speculative); Neutral indicates an expected total return ranging from -5% to 5% (Low risk) to -10% to 10% (Speculative); Underperform indicates expected return ranging from -5% to -15% (Low risk) to -10% to -20% (Speculative 
Market impact of changes in risk ratings
We report the mean market-adjusted return, absolute return, and volume traded in the 21-day window (-10 to +10) around changes in risk rating events. Market-adjusted return is a stock's daily return less the equally-weighted market return on the same day; absolute return is a stock's unsigned daily return; volume is a stock's daily trading volume (in number of shares) scaled by its total number of shares outstanding. Absolute returns and volume are standardized by first subtracting the mean and then dividing the difference by the standard deviation of their normal values. Normal absolute return and trading volume are estimated using 120 trading days (minimum 60 days) of data ending 20 days prior to the event, supplemented by post-event data if pre-event data are unavailable. We exclude trading days in the 21-day window around quarterly earnings announcements and the issuance of another risk rating report in computing normal values. We conduct T-test of the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero. Standard errors for the T-test are heteroscedasticity-consistent and adjusted to account for cross-correlation in daily returns. 
Panel B. Regression analysis
We report parameter estimates, clustered by calendar day standard errors (in parenthesis), number of observations and adjusted R 2 from a crosssectional analysis of 3-day cumulative market-adjusted returns on days on which analysts revise their investment ratings. Chrr is the difference between new and old Risk ratings; Chrec is the difference between new and old recommendations; Chexpret is the difference between current expected return (the difference between price target and current market price scaled by share price at the beginning of the fiscal year) and previous expected return. Positive values of Chrr and Chrec represent changes toward higher risk and less favorable recommendation. In column (4) we exclude observations occurring on 09/06/2002 (the date on which analysts adopt a 3-category recommendation system); in column (5) 
Panel C. Additional analysis
This panel extends Panel B by (1) including a proxy for concurrent news about future cash flows, and eliminating observations contaminated by (2) concurrent earnings announcements and (3) the dissemination of risk-related news. The proxy for concurrent news about future cash flows is the difference between current consensus -the average of all IBES earnings per share estimates disseminated in the [-1, 1] event window -and old consensus, constructed using all forecasts issued in the previous 3-month period. We identify observations with risk related news by searching the Dow Jones, Reuters and Press Release newswires for changes in dividend policies, changes in investment policies (merger and acquisition activities, divestures, asset sales, new project undertakings, joint ventures), changes in financing policies (debt and equity offerings and retirements/repurchases), changes in credit ratings and lawsuits. We conduct the search only for risk increases and risk decreases because this is where we observe a market reaction, and to minimize collection costs.
(1) [-150, 150] , and [-210, 210] . We also report the number of events, number of observations, and adjusted R-squared. We regress daily excess returns on the Fama-French factors interacted with a dummy variable equal to 0 when observations come from the pre-event period, [-90, -1] and 1 otherwise. We exclude events for which we do not have daily returns for every day in the corresponding event window. If a firm has multiple events whose event windows overlap, we keep only the first event.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroscedasticity-consistent and adjusted to account for cross-correlation in contemporaneous daily returns (Rogers, 1993 We exclude firms whose share price is less than $5 and winsorize the earnings growth variable at the top and bottom 1% level. The same firm needs to have available data throughout all nine quarters to be included in the sample.
We report the average earnings growth across all firms in the Risk increase/decrease samples for quarters -4 through +4, where quarter 0 is the event quarter. We also report the average pre-and post-event earnings growth (mean -4 to -1 and mean 1 to 4), and the difference between the two. We test whether such a difference is different from zero in the last two rows. Finally, we also examine the difference in earnings growth between the Risk increase and Risk decrease samples in the last column. 
